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Abstract
We adapt the model of Menzio and Moen (2010) to consider a labour market
with directed search in which rms can commit to wage contracts but cannot
commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that
there exists an incentive for rms to smooth wages over time and in the face of
shocks to labour productivity. To avoid worker replacement (which saves on
the ex ante wage bill), they may choose a wage for new hires that is equally
unresponsive to shocks. This leads to a large degree of downward rigidity
in the wages of new hires, and magnies the response of unemployment and
vacancies to negative shocks. Our version of the Menzio-Moen model allows
for the analysis of positive probability shocks in a tractable way. Moreover, we
argue that the model provides a useful framework for analysing other sources
of wage rigidity; for example adding asymmetric information can substantially
enhance the rigidity and the responsiveness of unemployment and vacancies
to productivity shocks.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a model in which wages of new hires are tied to wages of
those of ongoing workers. The implication is that if there is a reason for ongoing
wages to be rigid, this will be transmitted to the wages of new hires. And it is the
that latter that is important for employment uctuations.1
We adapt the model of Menzio & Moen (2010), henceforth MM. In their pa-
per overlapping generations of two-period lived rms interact with innitely lived
workers. We simplify the model to a two-period version that is more tractable for
our purposes, but the basic ideas are as in their paper. Firms can commit to wage
contracts, current and future, but not to employment. That is, they cannot commit
not to layo¤ a worker. In particular, if the wage for new hires is below that of
incumbents, the rm will have an incentive to replace its incumbents if it can nd
suitable applicants. Anticipating this, workers will have a preference for a contract
in which wages of future hires are never below their own wages, so that the rm will
have no incentive to attempt to replace them. It may then be that rms o¤er such
contracts as the ex ante costs of hiring are lower by a su¢ cient amount to o¤set
having to forgo the potential benet of a lower wage for new hires in some future
states. That is, it may be optimal to satisfy a no replacement constraint that
requires that the wage for new hires is never below that of incumbents.2
In adverse future states, because of the no replacement constraint, the rm will
trade-o¤ a desire to smooth the wages of workers in ongoing employment, with the
benets from cutting the wage for new entrants. Treated on their own merit, the
latter would receive a lower wage, but this would take it below the optimal wage
to be paid to incumbents. The upshot then is that there is a degree of downward
wage rigidity. The opposite is not true however. In particularly good states there
is no problem in paying a higher wage to new entrants than to incumbents, so the
rigidity only operates in a downward direction.
Because the wage for new entrants is allocational, the downwardly rigid wage
a¤ects hiring, and increases the variability of both unemployment and vacancies in
response to productivity shocks, a point made also by MM.
1A recent paper which analyses this idea within the search-matching model is Gertler & Trigari
(2009).
2This type of argument was also made in Snell & Thomas (2010) in the context of a perfectly
competitive labour market. MMs model however concerns a frictional labour market, and we
follow their approach. A related argument has been used in the insider-outsider literature; see
Gottfries & Sjostrom (2000).
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We also argue that this framework is useful for considering other models of
wage rigidity. We consider making the period 2 state of nature observable only
to the rm. In this case we show that wages may be fully rigid downwards, thus
further amplifying the variability of unemployment and vacancies. Such simple non-
contingent labour contracts are well documented (e.g., Oswald (1986), Blinder &
Choi (1990), and see Malcomson (1997) for an excellent overview).
2 The Model
We adapt the model of MM and adopt their notation where possible. There are
two periods t = 1; 2. We assume that each rm and worker lives for both periods
with K rms and S  K workers. Both K and S are large. We identify each rm
with an entrepreneur who owns it. In each period a representative rm operates a
decreasing returns technology producing a perishable good, with production function
f (n;x) ; where n is the current number of workers employed at the rm, x 2 X is a
productivity shock observable at the start of the period, and f 0 > 0; f 00 < 0. (Hours
per worker are not variable.) Current prots, not including job creation costs, are
given by f (n;x) wn, where w denotes the (real) wage paid in the current period.
We assume that x = x0 is xed at t = 1, but at t = 1, x is a random variable,
common across rms, with nite support. Henceforth x without a 0 subscript will
refer to the second period productivity shock. . Each worker has a per-period utility
of consumption function v (c), v0 > 0 and v00 < 0: Workers cannot borrow or save,
so consume all their current income; we assume there is no discounting of the future
by workers. Entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk-neutral, but they also have a
zero discount rate.
A rm has a wage policy  =

w1; (w2i)i=1;2

to which it commits, where i is
length of the workers tenure and w2i may be random (state contingent); so at t = 1
workers are o¤ered a wage contract (w1; w22) and period 2 hires are o¤ered w21. (We
also consider the case where there is no commitment to w21 later in the paper.) A
worker who accepts a contract at t = 1 su¤ers exogenous separation from the rm
at the end of the rst period, with probability . In this case he will be in the same
position as a worker who failed to gain employment in the rst period; in the second
period such unattached workers seek work.3 As in MM, contracting is assumed to
be at will, so during the matching stage of the second period (after observing x)
3MM assume that separated workers cannot work in the period immediately following separa-
tion.
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the rm can dismiss a worker without compensation, and a worker can quit without
penalty. We assume that such workers remain unemployed in their second period.
A worker who is unemployed in any period receives an income of b.
At the start of each period (in period 2;after x is observed), search and matching
occur. We assume directed search (see Moen (1997) for the seminal paper in this
area, and also Acemoglu & Shimer (1999), and Rudanko (2009)). We follow MM in
the following. Briey, an unemployed worker can apply for one job at a single rm
each period. We rule out on-the-job search, so that at t = 2 a worker cannot apply
for a job if he is already employed. We identify the typeof a job with the utility V a
successful applicant gets from it. The application succeeds with probability p( (V )),
where  (V ) ; the expected queue length for the job,is the ratio of applicants to
jobs of type V: (The determination of  (V ) is discussed below.) The function p () is
assumed to be strictly decreasing, di¤erentiable and such that p(0) = 1, p(1) = 0.
Correspondingly the rm lls a job of type V with probability q ( (V )) where q ()
is strictly increasing, and satises q() = p(), q(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1. Moreover,
denoting the elasticity of q wrt  by q (), q () q () = (1  q ()) is assumed to be a
decreasing function of .4 At t = 2, unemployed workers can apply for jobs that are
already lled; if there is a successful applicant, the rm can, by at will contracting,
choose whether to replace the incumbent or not. If w21  w22: rms will have no
incentive to do this, but for w21 < w22 the incentive exists and in this case a lled
job is as attractive as an unlled one from the point of view of an applicant. In
the latter case, then, to the extent that the matching process succeeds in selecting
a successful applicant, the incumbent is at risk of losing her position.
Simultaneously with committing to a wage policy at the start of t = 1, rms
choose how many new jobs ni to create in period i = 1; 2, at a cost of k > 0 per
job; n2 can depend on x. Unlled jobs from the rst period dieat the end of the
period, along with lled jobs in which exogenous separation occurred (little depends
on this). The implication is that employment at the rm in period i will increase
by q ( (V ))ni.
Our model di¤ers from MM in the following principal respects. First, our
workers are two-period lived rather than innitely lived, and we have a two-period
horizon. Secondly, rather than having rms of xed size (number of jobs) with
constant productivity per lled job and free entry of rms, we suppose that there
are a xed number of rms, each with a decreasing returns to scale technology. The
supply of jobs then varies not with variations in the number of rms entering the
4MM point out that many standard matching processes satisfy these assumptions.
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Figure 1: Timeline
market, but with the choice of rms about how many jobs (or "vacancies") to create
each period. The xed cost per job created replaces MMs assumption of a xed
cost incurred per rm that enters.
Let Z1 be the lifetime utility of a worker at the search stage, and Z2(x) that
of a worker at t = 2 searching for work in state x. (Z1 and Z2 are the endoge-
nous variables determining the economic environment facing the rm.) Dene
Z =
 
Z1; (Z2 (x))x2X

: The value to a worker at t = 1 from being employed by
a rm with wage policy  then is
V1(;Z) := v (w1) + E[Z2 (x) + (1  )v (w22)]
if the worker only faces a separation risk, where E denotes expectation. On the
other hand, if replacement occurs in some states, that is, if w21 < w22, then in such
states the term inside the square brackets must be replaced by
Z2 (x) + (1  )q (2) v (b) + (1  ) (1  q (2)) v (w22) ;
where 2 = 2(w21; Z2 (x)) (dened below) is the queue length in that state for a
rm o¤ering w21: This reects the additional risk q (2) to a surviving worker of
being replaced by a successful applicant.5
5To avoid complicating the exposition, we shall ignore the possibility that at the optimal period
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Let U1 be the lifetime utility of a worker at t = 1 who fails to get a job:
U1 (Z) = v(b) + E [Z2(x))] ;
as currently the worker receives b and is able to search next period, Given U1 and
Z1, the expected queue length for a job o¤ering V1 is assumed to satisfy:
1(V1; Z1; U1) =
(
 : p()V1 + (1  p())U1 = Z1; if V1 > Z1
0; if V1  Z1
(1)
The idea is that if the value of the job to a successful applicant, V1, is greater than
the value of search, Z1, the expected queue length is driven up to the point where
workers are indi¤erent between applying for the job and searching somewhere else,
and vice versa. The expected queue length for the job will be zero if the value of
the job is less than (or equal to) the value of search.
For a worker at t = 2 the value from being employed at the wage w21 is v(w21),
so the expected queue length for period 2 rms and workers for a job with wage w21
is
2(w21; Z2) =
(
 : p()v (w21) + (1  p())v (b) = Z2; if v (w21) > Z2
0; if v (w21)  Z2
(2)
Assuming that incumbents are not replaced in period 2, a rms prot is:
F (;n1;(n2 (x))x2X ;Z) = (f (n1)  w1n1   kn1) +
E [(f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w22(1  )n1   w21n2   kn2)]
where ni is the number of new hires in period i, and is given by ni = q (i)ni,
i = 1, 2, where i depends on  as given by 1(V1 (; Z) ; Z1; U1 (Z)) in (1) and
2(w21; Z2 (x)) in (2) above. Otherwise, in any state where replacement occurs, the
expression for second period prot is replaced by
f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w22(1  q (2))(1  )n1   w21 (n2 + q (2) (1  )n1)  kn2;
where q (2) (1  )n1 is the number of incumbents who are replaced by new hires,
and n2 = q (2)n2 is the number of new hires into newly created jobs.
Competitive Search Equilibrium
We dene an equilibrium
2 wage, the rm would prefer to dismiss some of its incumbents. This would arise if w22 >
f 0 ((1  )n1;x). Likewise, we assume that w22  b; or otherwise it would be in the interests of
the worker to quit. In our simulations, parameters are chosen such that neither scenario arises.
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Denition 1 A stationary competitive search equilibrium consists of search values
Z1; (Z2 (x))x2X , and a wage policy  and job creation plan
 
n1; (n2 (x))x2X

with the
following properties:
(i) Prot maximization: For all (0;n01; (n
0
2 (x))x2X),
F ((;n1; (n2 (x))x2X) ;Z)  F (0;n01; (n02 (x))x2X ;Z) ;
and
(ii) Consistency: 1 (V1 (; Z) ; Z1; U1) = S=n1, and, for all x, if w21  w22 (no
replacement occurs), 2(w21; Z2 (x)) = S2=n2 (x) where S2 = ((1  p (S=n1)) + p (S=n1))S
is the number of old workers (per rm) seeking work in period 2, while if w21 < w22
(replacement occurs) 2(w21 (x) ; Z2 (x)) = S2= (n2 (x) + (1  ) q (S=n1)n1).
2.0.1 No replacement in state x
We start by characterizing an optimal policy assuming that in state x, w21  w22.
We will deal with the issue of whether this is optimal below, that is whether a policy
with w21 < w22 might yield higher prots. We proceed heuristically.6 In period 2
in any state x, given n1 and w1, following MM it can be shown that the rm must
locally maximize prots plus weighted incumbent utility.7 In particular, given it is
optimal not to replace, it must maximize
f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w22(1  )n1   w21n2   kn2 +
(1=v0 (w1))n1 ((1  ) v (w22) + Z2 (x)) ; (3)
with respect to n2; w21; w22; w21  w22, where n2 = q ( (w21; Z2 (x)))n2 =: ~q (w21; x)n2.
We write ~q0  @~q=@w21. Note that the last term in (3) includes the continuation
utility of an incumbent, taking into account the separation possibility, and multi-
plied by the number of incumbents. The intuition here is that any change which
6The following necessary conditions are derived formally in the Appendix by considering the
two-period problem. Alternatively, it can be directly established that (3) below must hold at a
local maximum subject to w21  w22.
7MM introduce a sunspot into their model, and this allows the rm to randomize between
replacement and no-replacement. They can then show that an equivalent of (3) must be maxi-
mized across replacement/no replacement regimes and derive analytical su¢ cient conditions for
no-replacement to be optimal. We could follow a similar approach here, but as we are able to
compute numerical solutions straightforwardly the solution can be checked directly. Moreover the
restriction to contracts dependent only on the productivity shock simplies the presentation.
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a¤ects the utility of the rms old workers can be o¤set by a change in the rst
period wage, leaving V1 unchanged (and hence n1). Multiplying the utility change
through by the inverse of rst period marginal utility then converts it (for a small
change) to the rst period wage saving per worker. If this was not satised then
prots can be increased.
There are two cases to consider:
(A) If the no replacement constraintw21  w22 is not binding, then di¤eren-
tiating (3) with respect to w22;
(1  )n1 = n1 (1=v0 (w1)) ((1  ) v0 (w22)) ; (4)
so that w1 = w22. Intuitively the rm should stabilize the wages of the rst period
hires if there is no cost to doing this. In this case, also di¤erentiating with respect
to w21; we get
f 0 ((1  )n1 + n2;x) q0n2   w21q0n2   qn2 = 0; (5)
and simplifying:
f 0 (n) ~q0   w21~q0   q = 0;
where n  (1  )n1 + n2. Finally, di¤erentiating with respect to n2,
f 0 (n) = w21 + k=q: (6)
We can combine these latter two to get
q2 (~q0) 1 = k: (7)
Intuitively, in order to increase employment by one unit, the rm could open 1=q
jobs at a cost of k=q. Alternatively a wage increase of 1= (n2~q0) ; holding the number
of jobs constant, accomplishes the same thing by increasing the probability each
existing job is lled, at a cost of qn2  1= (n2~q0) = q=~q0. The two must be equal in
equilibrium.
In the proof of Proposition 1 it is shown that (7) can be solved to give a
positively sloped locus of values for n2 and w21 compatible with equilibrium. This
locus denes an upward sloping quasi-supply curve of labor: when equilibrium
n2 is higher, it is harder to ll each job because the labor market is tighter (2 is
lower, so k=q (2) is higher); this makes wage increases more attractive as a way
of lling jobs than creating jobs, so w21 rises until the two methods cost the same.
This locus is independent of the protability of lling a job. We refer to this as
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the commitment quasi-supply curve. It corresponds to the solution to the rst-order
conditions in the case where rms can commit not to replace incumbent workers,
and thus ignores the no-replacement constraint w21  w22. (The two coincide in this
case because the constraint is not binding by assumption.) Combining this with the
downward sloping (6), which is a standard labor demand equation, where the unit
cost of increasing employment k=q (2) is added to the wage (itself increasing as
n2 increases), yields a unique equilibrium for each productivity shock whenever the
no-replacement constraint does not bind. Denote the solution of (6) and (7) by 
wC2i (x;w1; n1) ; n
C
2 (x;w1; n1)

, where the C superscript indicates that this is the
solution to the FOCs in the case of commitment.
Since in this case, w21  w22 = w1, we conclude that the intersection of (6) and
(7) occurs at or above w1.
(B) If on the other hand w21  w22 is binding at the optimum, the intersection
of (6) and (7) occurs at a wage below w1 but the wage can be shown to be above
wC21 (x;w1; n1) ; while employment is below n
C
2 (x;w1; n1). In the proof it is shown
that k < q2=~q0. The unit cost of increasing employment through creating extra jobs,
k=q, is lower than that through increasing wages, q2=~q0 but it would not pay to cut
wages and increase jobs as the wage cut has a negative externality on incumbents
wage smoothing. More intuitively, if productivity is low enough that the equilibrium
hiring wage under commitment wC21 would be below w1, then the no-replacement
constraint would be violated (recall that wC22 = w1). To satisfy the constraint, w22
must be cut, which is costly as it reduces wage smoothing so rms are less willing
to let wages fall. The quasi-labor-supply curve is thus atter below w1.
Consequently, taking as given w1; we can plot a no-commitment quasi-supply
curve in w21   n2 space, which coincides with the commitment one above w1, but
below w1 the curve lies above the commitment curve. Equilibrium occurs at the
intersection with the labor demand curve. As x varies, the latter curve is shifted.
In the gure, a situation where the crossing point occurs below w1 is illustrated.
The equilibrium values are at point A, rather than at the commitment solution.8
If x is su¢ ciently high that the intersection occurs above w1, then the equilibrium
will be at the commitment solution,
 
wC2i (x;w1; n1) ; n
C
2 (x;w1; n1)

. The proposition
summarizes the discussion.
8If commitment was allowed in such a state, unless the state has negligible probability, then the
equilibrium two-period contract may be di¤erent, that is, w1 and n1 may di¤er. The proposition
concerns the implied values of wC21 and n
C
2 in a hypothetical equilibrium which has the same period
1 values.
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Proposition 1 Suppose replacement does not occur in state x. Then (a) if equi-
librium hiring wages in period 2 are below period 1 wages, w21 < w1, the wage
is higher and employment is lower than they would be in that state if rms were
able to commit, that is, w21 > wC21 (x;w1; n1) and n2 < n
C
2 (x;w1; n1); moreover
w22 = w21 < w1. Otherwise (b) wages and employment are at the commitment
levels: wNC21 (x;w1; n1) = w
C
21 (x;w1; n1) and n
NC
2 (x;w1; n1) = n
C
2 (x;w1; n1) ; with
wNC22 (x;w1; n1) = w1. Case (a) occurs when the labor demand curve intersects the
commitment quasi-supply curve below w1; otherwise case (b) occurs.
Proof. We derive necessary conditions by considering the following Lagrangean,
assuming an interior solution and assuming that there is no replacement in state x.
We give the appropriate expression if there is no undercutting in period 2 in any
state; otherwise an analogous argument applies (if there is replacement in some state
x0 6= x it modies the expectation term in (8) and (11) but they cancel).
(f (~q1 (V1)n1)  w1~q1 (V1)n1   kn1) +
Ex0 [(f ((1  )~q1 (V1)n1 + ~q (w21; x0)n2;x0)  w22(1  )~q1 (V1)n1   w21~q (w21; x0)n2   kn2)]
+Ex0 [x0 (w21   w22)];
where ~q1 (V1) is dened analogously to ~q (w21; x), x0 is the multiplier on the w21 
w22 constraint in state x0 and recall V1 = v (w1) + E[Z2 (x0) + (1   )v (w22 (x0))].
This leads to the FOCs:
~q01v
0 (w1)n1(f 0 (n1) w1+Ex0 [f 0 (n;x0) (1 ) w22 (x0) (1 )])  ~q1 (V1)n1 = 0 (8)
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f 0 (n;x) ~q (w21; x)  w21~q (w21; x)  k = 0 (9)
f 0 (n;x) ~q0n2   ~q (w21; x)n2   w21~q0n2 + x = 0 (10)
~q01v
0 (w22 (x)) (1  )n1(f 0 (n1)  w1 +
Ex0 [ f
0 (n;x0) (1  )  w22 (x0) (1  )])  x   (1  )~q1 (V1)n1 = 0 (11)
together with the complementary slackness conditions. Note that (9) implies (6) in
the text.
From (8) and (11),
v0 (w1)
v0 (w22)

q1 +
x
n1 (1  )

= q1: (12)
Using this to eliminate x in (10):
f 0 (n;x) ~q0n2   ~q (w21; x)n2   w21~q0n2 + q1n1 (1  )

v0 (w22)
v0 (w1)
  1

= 0: (13)
There are two cases.
A. If x = 0, then from (12) w1 = w22, and (13) implies (5) in the text and
hence (7). We characterize points which satisfy (7). For clarity, we let ~w21 and ~2
denote the individual rms values. Then
~q0 =
dq
d2
d~2
d ~w21
jZ2 constant :
From (2),
d~2
d ~w21
jZ2 constant=  
pv0 (w21)
dp
d2
(v (w21)  v (b))
;
and di¤erentiating q = p  2 to eliminate dpd2 , we get
~q0 =   dq
d2
p2v
0 (w21)
dq
d2
  p

(v (w21)  v (b))
:
After rearrangement,
q2
~q0
= q2

1  2
q
dq
d2

2
dq
d2
v (w21)  v (b)
v0 (w21)
:
From our assumption on q, q2 is increasing in 2; and the second term in the product
is also increasing in 2 (it is the inverse of q () q () = (1  q ())) while the nal
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term is increasing in w21. Thus the locus of values of 2 and w21 such that (7) holds
is negatively sloped. Recall that n2 = p (2)S2, and as p0 < 0, there is a one-to-one
negative relationship between n2 and 2. So (7) can be solved to give a positively
sloped locus of values for n2 and w21 compatible with equilibrium.
Next, (9) is negatively sloped in n2   w21 space by f 00 < 0 and q (2) =
q (p 1 (n2=S2)) ; q0 > 0; p0 < 0. Therefore (w21; n2) is at the unique intersection
point, denoted by
 
wC21 (x;w1; n1) ; n
C
2 (x;w1; n1)

in the text. Since w21  w1 im-
plies x = 0 (see next line), this establishes claim (b).
B. If x > 0, then w22 = w21 and from (12) w1 > w22 = w21; and (13) implies
(1  )n1   (f 0 (n) ~q0n2   w21~q0n2   qn2) = n1 (1=v0 (w1)) ((1  ) v0 (w21)) : (14)
(This also follows from di¤erentiating (3) with respect to w21 after setting w21 =
w22.) Thus, eliminating f 0 using (9), and using n2 = qn2,
1 +
(1  k~q0=q2)n2
n1 (1  ) =
v0 (w21)
v0 (w1)
; (15)
so that as w21 < w1, k~q0=q2 < 1; i.e., k < q2=~q0. Holding n2 (and hence 2) constant,
q2=~q0 is increasing in w21, so the locus of points (n2; w21) satisfying (15) must lie
above w21 is higher that dened by (7). At w21 = w1 we have k~q0=q2 = 1; so the
two loci coincide. Thus the downward sloping (9) must intersect (15) at a higher
wage and a lower value for n2 than it would intersect (7). This establishes claim (a).
Since x > 0 if and only if w21 < w1, the nal claim of the proposition follows.
2.0.2 Replacement in state x
If replacement occurs, again the rm must locally maximize prots plus weighted
incumbent utility:
f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w22(1  )(1  q)n1   w21 (q(1  )n1 + n2)  kn2
+n1 (1=v
0 (w1)) ((1  ) (1  q) v (w22) + Z2 + (1  ) qv (b)) ;
where n2 is again the number of new jobs created, and n2 = q ( (w21; Z2 (x)))n2:
Then di¤erentiating with respect to w22;
(1  )(1  q)n1 = n1 (1=v0 (w1)) ((1  ) (1  q) v0 (w22)) ; (16)
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so that w1 = w22, as expected. Intuitively the rm should stabilize the wages of the
rst period hires as there is no cost to doing this given the replacement probability
is independent of w22. Di¤erentiating with respect to w21 we get
f 0 (n;x) q0n2  w21q0 ((1  )n1 + n2)  q ((1  )n1 + n2) + (17)
n1 (1=v
0 (w1)) (1  ) (q0) (v (b)  v (w22)) = 0 (18)
where the latter term is the extra cost of compensating more replaced workers for
their loss of utility whereas previously we got
f 0 (n;x) q0n2   w21q0n2   qn2 = 0
and di¤erentiating with respect to n2,
f 0 (n;x) q = w21q + k: (19)
We can combine these latter two to get
(k=q) q0n2 w21q0 ((1  )n1)+n1 (1=v0 (w1)) (1  ) (q0) (v (b)  v (w22)) = q ((1  )n1 + n2)
(20)
instead of
k~q0=q = q: (21)
Note then that the RHS of (20), if we divide through by n2; is bigger, while the LHS
is smaller. Recall that q2=~q0 is increasing in  and w21:Thus to reestablish equality
we need to decrease q2=~q0, that is at xed  we reduce w21; so in w21    space, the
downward sloping locus must be shifted downward.
Given the tractability of the model, we proceed in our simulations by computing
an equilibrium under the assumption that replacement is not optimal in any state.
We then check whether replacement can improve prots. If this is true, we have
an equilibrium but this does not logically rule out the possibility of an equilibrium
with replacement existing at the same time.9
2.1 Simulation
We report the following simulation. Suppose that the matching technology is given
by p() = M 1, q() = M, where M = 1=10 and  = 1=2 (this is the same
specication used in MM). Further v(c) = c0:5; f (n) = x log (n) ;  = 0:2; k = 0:02;
9Although in none of the simulations carried out has this occurred.
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b = 0:2; S = 10; the period 1 deterministic state is x0 = 11;while there are two
possible states at t = 2 : xl = 10; xh = 12, probability(xl) =probability(xh) = 0:5.
For these values, under commitment we nd that w21 (x) < w1 in both states
(by a margin of 14% in xl). Wages vary by 12% across the two states (expressed
relative to w21 (xl)). Without commitment the no replacement constraint binds in
both states. Wage variation across the two states is under 6%, hence lower, in line
with Proposition 1. Unemployment varies by 21% more in the no commitment case,
and the change in vacancies is 17% higher.
So, as anticpated, the lack of commitment leads to an amplication of the
variability of unemployment and vacancies as productivity changes, although in our
simulation the change is not too substantial.
3 Real Rigidity
So far we have seen that equal treatment leads to a measure of downward real rigidity.
We now consider adding asymmetric information about the period 2 state x; and we
argue that this may lead to a completely rigid period 2 wage for incumbents, and also
for new hires for a range of adverse shocks. We will assume that in period 2 ongoing
hires in a rm cannot observe x (nor z2 so they cannot infer x). Consequently, the
contract cannot make the second period wage contingent on the state of nature. We
assume further that a worker cannot observe the total employment or vacancies at
the rm. This contrasts with earlier models in the asymmetric information implicit
contracting literature in which labour supply is observable to workers (Chari 1983,
Green & Kahn 1983, Grossman & Hart 1981)  in a single worker model as usually
considered this is inevitable of course. In practice, however, the level of employment
in a rm can be di¢ cult to dene precisely. For example, if the relevant employment
level is at the plant, the rm may be able to move production to other companies
or plants within the same company, making it di¢ cult to condition on employment
(as argued by Stiglitz (1986)).
These assumptions, when there is no commitment and if the solution satsies
the no replacement constraint, can lead to a form of contract that has a xed period
2 wage and the employer unilaterally chooses the level of employment. Suppose
there are two states at t = 2 and that we are in the region where the no replacement
constraint is binding in both states. If the wage varies with the state but is below
the period 1 wage, the rm will always prefer to announce the state associated
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with the lowest wage. It benets from paying a lower wage to its existing employees.
In addition because the wage for new hires would optimally be set lower than the
no-commitment wage, the rm would benet from a lower wage just considering
this group. So for both reasons period 2 prots increase as wages are reduced.
Consequently the only incentive compatible contract has a non-contingent wage.
Note that this logic may not apply if there are states in which the no replacement
constraint does not bind. In this case the rm will prefer to have the new hire wage
above that of the incumbent, so that the new hire wage is exible upwards.
Consider instead the nature of the contract with these informational assump-
tions but with commitment (not to replace) on the part of the rm. The rm then
will o¤er a non-contingent contract to period 1 hires (equal to w1), but would be
unrestricted in o¤ering the optimal hiring wage to period 2 workers. Since a stable
wage for incumbents is optimal, the solution will be identical to the commitment
solution considered earlier. Without commitment, though, as just argued, if the
solution satsies the no replacement constraint, then the fact that wages are non
contingent has direct implications for hires. On the other hand if in any state x the
solution violates the no replacement constraint, the new hire wage is set optimally.
As before, assuming that incumbents are not replaced in period 2, a rms prot
is:
F (;n1; (n2 (x))x2X ;Z) = (f (n1)  w1n1   kn1) + E[Fx]
where Fx is period 2 prots in state x and is given by either
FNRx (;n1; n2 (x) ;Z) := (f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w22(1  )n1   w21n2   kn2)
if no replacement occurs (again ni is the number of new hires in period i, and is given
by ni = q (i)ni, i = 1, 2, where i depends on  as given by 1(V1 (; Z) ; Z1; U1 (Z))
in (1) and 2(w21; Z2 (x)) in (2) above) or if replacement occurs, the expression for
second period prot in state x is given by
FRx (;n1; n2 (x) ;Z) := f ((1  )n1 + n2;x)  w22(1  q (2))(1  )n1
 w21 (n2 + q (2) (1  )n1)  kn2;
where as before q (2) (1  )n1 is the number of incumbents who are replaced by
new hires, and n2 = q (2)n2 is the number of new hires into newly created jobs.
We now have the maximisation problem as:
(;n1; (n2 (x))x2X) maximises F ((;n1; (n2 (x))x2X) ;Z) subject to the incen-
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tive compatibility constraints10
FNRx (;n1; n2 (x) ;Z) 
max
x0;n02
f(f ((1  )n1 + n02;x)  w22(x0)(1  )n1   w21(x0)n02   kn02)g
and
FRx (;n1; n2 (x) ;Z)  max
x0;n02
ff ((1  )n1 + n02;x)  w22(x0)(1  q (2))(1  )n1
 w21 (x0) (n02 + q (2) (1  )n1)  kn02g;
where n02 = q (2)n
0
2 and 2 = 2(w21(x
0); Z2 (x)):
3.0.1 Simulation
We use the same values as before. For these values the optimal contract species
a constant wage (w21 (xl) = w22 (xl) = w21 (xh) = w22 (xh)) 7% below w1. This
increases unemployment variability by 45% relative to the commitment model, and
vacancy variability by 46%.
3.1 Near Rationality
In this subsection we want to argue that the additional costs of imposing some
additional real rigidity will be small in this environment, and moreover that the this
model provides a framework for analysing how rigid wages in ongoing wage contracts
is tramsmitted to new hires. Suppose that the productivity shock turns out to be
close but not identical to what was expected. Consider rst the case where there is
commitment (not to replace incumbents). In this case, the cost of not anticipating
this state will be minimal considering only the incumbent worker situation, since a
rigid real wage is desirable in any case. Likewise, since the rm has no reason to
commit to its wage for period 2 hires, it can simply reoptimize when it observes the
current state. If however the rm has precommitted to w22 it may su¤er some loss
10This ignores the possibility that in a no replacement state the rm can announce a state x0
in which replacement occurs, and vice versa, but we have suppressed the additional inequalities to
avoid too cumbersome a presentation. Likewise these ex post (after the period 2 state is observed)
constraints are necessary, but since n1 is also unobservable then the IC constraints should be
expressed in terms of an ex ante constraint which requires that should the rm deviate at date 1
and in any date two states it cannot increase its discounted prot. The simulations use the ex ante
constraint.
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relative to a fully contingent situation because it is not choosing w22 optimally, but
this would still be second-order by the usual argument given the frictional labour
market.
Suppose instead that there is no commitment (not to replace incumbents) and
the period 2 shock is such that the no replacement constraint is binding, as in
Proposition 1. In this case a slight deviation from the anticipated shock leads to
a cost because the wage ideally should vary with the shock, although not by very
much as we have seen. So the cost from not having a contingent wage would be
expected to be small, even relative to the second-order e¤ect in the commitment
case.
We check this in the example considered above. We consider for both the
commitment and no commitment cases, equilibria where contracts are restricted
to being non-contingent, despite a 20% di¤erence in the (multiplicative) period 2
shock. In both cases we then compute the change in prots if, starting in the
respective equilibrium, a rmmoves to a contingent (commitment or no-commitment
respectively) contract. In line with the intuition just given we nd that the change
in prot in the no commitment case is indeed smaller, less than half.
References
Acemoglu, D. & Shimer, R. (1999), E¢ cient unemployment insurance, Journal of
Political Economy 107(5), 893928.
Blinder, A. S. & Choi, D. H. (1990), A shred of evidence on theories of wage
stickiness, Quarterly Journal of Economics 55, 10041015.
Chari, V. V. (1983), Involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 98(Supplement), 107122.
Gertler, M. & Trigari, A. (2009), Unemployment uctuations with staggered nash
wage bargaining, Journal of Political Economy 117(1), 3886.
Gottfries, N. & Sjostrom, T. (2000), Insider bargaining power, starting wages, and
involuntary unemployment, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102, 669688.
Green, J. & Kahn, C. M. (1983), Wage employment contracts, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 98(Supplement), 173187.
16
Grossman, S. J. & Hart, O. D. (1981), Implicit contracts, moral hazard, and un-
employment, American Economic Review 71, 301307.
Malcomson, J. M. (1997), Contracts, hold-up, and labor markets, Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 35, 19161957.
Menzio, G. & Moen, E. R. (2010), Worker replacement, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 57(6), 623636.
Moen, E. R. (1997), Competitive search equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy
105(2), 385411.
Oswald, A. J. (1986), Unemployment-insurance and labor contracts under asym-
metric information - theory and facts, American Economic Review 76, 365377.
Rudanko, L. (2009), Labor market dynamics under long-term wage contracting,
Journal of Monetary Economics 56(2).
Snell, A. & Thomas, J. P. (2010), Labor contracts, equal treatment and wage-
unemployment dynamics, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics .
Stiglitz, J. E. (1986), Theories of wage rigidity, in J. L. Butkiewicz, K. J. Koford &
J. B. Miller, eds, Keyneseconomic legacy: Contemporary economic theories,
Praeger, New York, pp. 153206.
17
